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ABSTRACT 
The cognitive model of OCD proposes that certain beliefs may contribute to the 
development and maintenance of this disorder. To date, however, it is not yet clear which 
beliefs are more relevant for explaining OCD symptomatology; moreover, their causal 
status is yet to be clearly established. In the effort to identify other constructs and 
processes related to OCD, the phenomenon labeled “not just right experiences” (NJREs) 
has received increasing attention. In this study, measures of NJREs (the NJRE-Q-R), OCD 
symptoms, general distress (i.e., anxiety, and depression), and perfectionism were 
administered to a large sample of college students and a small sample of OCD and non-
OCD patients. The clinical sample completed also a measure of OC beliefs. Results 
showed that NJREs could be reliably measured through a self-report format in non-clinical 
and clinical Italian individuals. A specific association between NJREs severity and OCD 
symptoms was found in the non-clinical sample, after controlling for anxiety, depression 
and perfectionism. The NJRE-Q-R Severity scale clearly discriminated OCD patients from 
patients with other anxiety disorders or depression. Lastly, the NJREs measure 
differentiated the clinical groups when OC beliefs were controlled, whereas OC beliefs did 
not discriminate among the groups after NJREs severity was controlled. The concept of 
NJREs may contribute to improve current psychological and biological model of OCD. 
 
Keywords: not just right experiences; cognitive theory of obsessions; psychological 
processes; obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by persistent, intrusive, and 
distressing obsessions (persistent thoughts, impulses, or images) or compulsions 
(repetitive, excessive behaviors or mental acts) and associated with marked impairments 
in quality of life (Eisen et al., 2006; Parkin, 1997). OCD has a chronic course, with 
symptom intensity typically remaining elevated once it has reached clinical levels (e.g., 
Mataix-Cols et al., 2002). 
The cognitive model of OCD has been extensively studied (e.g., Frost & Steketee, 
2002). It proposes that certain beliefs contribute to the development and maintenance of 
this disorder by facilitating maladaptive interpretations of common intrusive thoughts (Frost 
& Steketee, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985, 1996). Whereas early experimental work has shown 
that manipulating OC-related beliefs leads to changes in OC behavior (e.g., Bouchard, 
Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1999; Jones & Menzies, 1998; Ladouceur, Rheaume, & Aublet, 
1997; Lopatka & Rachman,1995; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Spaan, 1999), it is still not 
clear which beliefs are more relevant and/or useful for explaining OCD symptomatology. 
For instance, a study of large clinical (248 patients with OCD, 105 patients with anxiety 
disorders without OCD) and non-clinical samples (87 non-clinical adults and 291 university 
students) showed that three cognitive domains (responsibility, control of thoughts, 
importance of thoughts) discriminated OCD patients from patients with anxiety disorders 
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, OCCWG,  2003). Other studies 
reported different and contrasting results in exploring the relationship between OC beliefs 
and OCD symptoms (Belloch, Morillo & Garcia-Soriano, 2007; Sica et al., 2004; Sica, 
Taylor, Arrindell & Sanavio, 2006).  
Also, which factor structure best represents the most commonly-used measure of 
OC beliefs content (the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire;OCCWG, 2003) remains in 
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question (see Careau, O'Connor, Turgeon, & Freeston, 2003; Dorz et al.,2009; Faull, 
Joseph, Meaden, & Lawrence, 2004; OCCWG, 2005; Taylor, McKay, & Abramowitz, 
2005). 
Of more relevance, the causal role of OC beliefs in producing OC symptoms has yet 
to be clearly established. One longitudinal study indicated that parents’ tendency to 
negatively interpret intrusive infant-related thoughts early in the postpartum period 
mediated the relationship between pre-childbirth OC beliefs and late postpartum OC 
symptoms (Abramowitz, Nelson, Rygwall & Khandker, 2007). However, a recent 6-month 
longitudinal study found that OC-beliefs were of only modest value in predicting OC 
symptoms variation among college students (Coles, Pietrefesa, Schofield, & Cook, 2008).  
One reason for these inconsistent findings may lie in the lack of specificity of OC 
beliefs (Steketee, Frost, & Wilson, 2002). For example, in some studies the correlations 
between OC beliefs and measures of general distress (e.g., anxiety, depression, worry) 
were approximately similar to those with OCD symptom measures (OCCWG, 2003; 2005; 
see also Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006). According to other authors, belief domains 
may not play a role in some OCD symptom subtypes (Calameri et al.,2006; Taylor et al., 
2006). Lastly, some studies found an association between the OC domains and cultural 
features such as superstitiousness and religiosity (Sica, Novara, & Sanavio, 2002(a); Sica, 
Novara, & Sanavio, 2002(b)), a result which raises doubts about the specificity of these 
cognitive domains for psychopathology (see also Julien et al., 2006 and the review by 
Julien, O'Connor & Aardema, 2007).  
In an effort to identify other constructs and processes relevant to OCD, some 
scholars have turned their attention to the phenomenon labeled “not just right experiences” 
(NJREs). This is defined as “the subjective sense that something isn’t just as it should be”, 
an unsettled feeling because something in the individual or in the world around them is not 
right (Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rhéaume, 2003). One reason for interest in this construct 
5 
 
is that it well fits clients’ descriptions of their OCD symptoms. In addition, clinicians have 
long observed NJREs among clients with OCD. In 1903 Janet wrote of “an inner sense of 
imperfection” and described the experience as follows: “they feel that actions that they 
perform are incompletely achieved or that they do not produce the sought-for satisfaction” 
(Pitman, 1987b, p. 226). Other authors have described analogous phenomena in different 
terms: sense of incompleteness (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992), feeling of knowing 
(Rapoport, 1991), just right perceptions (Leckman,Walker, Goodman, Pauls, & Cohen, 
1994), sensory phenomena (Miguel et al., 2000; see Summerfeldt, 2004, for an excellent 
introduction to this concept).  
 NJREs seem also to capture the perfectionistic-like quality of OCD. It has long been 
suggested that perfectionistic thinking may be linked to obsessions and compulsions 
(McFall & Wollersheim, 1979). Studies with non-clinical samples have found perfectionistic 
attitudes such as “concern over mistakes” and “doubts about actions” to be positively 
correlated with total scores on self report measures of OCD features, even when 
controlling for responsibility or general distress (e.g., Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 
1990; Rhéaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995; Tolin, Brady, & Hannan, 
2008). Recently, Wu and Cortesi (2009) examined the relationship between perfectionism 
and OCD in a large non-clinical sample. They concluded that the association between 
perfectionism and OC symptoms was higher than the association between perfectionism 
and depression. Actually, NJREs-like concepts (sensations of imperfection) have 
frequently been discussed in empirical work on individuals with OCD (Baer, 1994; 
Calamari, Wiegartz, & Janeck, 1999; see also Tozzi et al. 2004).  
  Concepts similar to NJREs have been also included in some theoretical models of 
OCD. The cybernetic model of OCD (Pitman, 1987a) proposes that the core problem in 
OCD is a mismatch between the perceptual input and internal reference signals (i.e., 
expectations). Summerfeldt and colleagues posit the existence of two continuous 
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orthogonal core dimensions—harm avoidance and incompleteness—that cut across overt 
symptoms and, in combination, may underlie most manifestations of OCD (Summerfeldt, 
Richter, Antony & Swinson, 1999). The intriguing model by Szechtman and Woody (2004) 
contends that OCD stems from an inability to generate the normal “feeling of knowing” that 
would otherwise signal task completion and terminate the expression of a security 
motivational system.  
Additionally, biological models of OCD seem highly compatible with the concept of 
NJREs. Dysregulated activity in frontostriatal system is proposed to underlie the enhanced 
response monitoring often observed in patients with OCD (e.g., Brieter et al., 1996; 
Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000) and may manifest as persistent “error signals” 
erroneously prompting the individual to (fruitless) corrective action (Maltby, Tolin, 
Worhunsky, O’Keefe & Kiehl, 2005; Pitman, 1987a; Schwartz, 1999; Szechtman & Woody, 
2004; Van Veen & Carter, 2002).  
It is therefore a bit surprising that NJREs have been so little studied. In a study, 
63% of 40 individuals with OCD with or without Tourette’s Disorder endorsed repetitive 
behaviors preceded by feelings of things not being just right (Miguel et al., 2000). In two 
studies with large undergraduate samples, Coles et al. (2003) reported that NJREs were 
significantly related to OCD features. Further, NJREs were significantly more strongly 
correlated with OCD symptoms than other domains of psychopathology (e.g., social 
anxiety, worry, depression). Lastly, experimentally induced NJREs produced distress and 
urges to change something, but not feared consequences, in undergraduate students 
(Coles, Heimberg, Frost, & Steketee, 2005). This is consistent with conceptualizations of 
compulsions aimed at reducing a sensation of something being not just right or feeling 
incomplete. In the same study, many significant relationships were revealed between 
NJREs and OCD-related constructs, while none were found with non-OCD-related 
constructs (Coles et al., 2005). 
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The Current Study 
Given the promising role of NJREs in OCD, the present study sought to add to the 
limited evidence regarding the association between NJREs and obsessive-compulsive 
features. To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies of non-English speaking 
individuals.  
Our first purpose was to evaluate the psychometric properties of an existing 
measure of NJREs in Italian non-clinical and clinical individuals. For this purpose, 
measures of NJREs, OCD symptoms, general distress (anxiety, depression) and 
perfectionism were administered to a large sample of college students and a small sample 
of OCD patients. These samples permitted us to investigate the psychometric properties of 
the NJRE-Q-R (Coles et al., 2005) used in several previous studies, as well as to examine 
its association with OCD and non OCD symptoms. In addition, we wanted to ascertain 
whether NJREs represented a form of perfectionism.  
We chose an undergraduate nonclinical sample for this aim to provide a wide range 
of scores on measures of OCD symptoms (Coles et al., 2008; OCCWG, 2005), given 
theoretical assumptions that OC phenomena lie on a continuum from normality to 
psychopathology (e.g., Burns, Formea, Keortge, & Sternberger, 1995; Sternberger & 
Burns, 1990). Moreover, previous research has demonstrated the utility of student 
samples in advancing theories of OCD (see Gibbs, 1996, for a review). 
Our second purpose was to compare OC beliefs and NJREs in accounting for OCD 
symptoms. Toward this aim, three small clinical samples (OCD, non-OCD anxiety 
disorders and mood disorders individuals) completed the Italian version of a well validated 
measure of OC beliefs, the NJRE-Q-R, and symptom measures of OCD, perfectionism 
and general distress. We tested two hypotheses: 1) the NJRE-Q-R would discriminate 
OCD from non-OCD patients after general distress and perfectionism were taken into 
8 
 
account; 2) a measure of OC beliefs would not discriminate OCD from non-OCD patients 
after controlling for NJREs, but the NJRE-Q-R would discriminate among clinical samples 
after OC beliefs were controlled. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants and Procedures 
The student sample contained 412 undergraduate students (18.9% male) recruited 
at the University of Padova in nothern Italy. All participants were Caucasian and single. 
The mean age of the sample was 22.3 years (SD=2.5; range=18-35) and the mean years 
of education was 15.1 (SD=1.9; range= 8-18). Undergraduates were recruited during 
public lectures by Psychology faculty. Participants completed self-report measures in 
groups with a psychologist present to respond to requests for clarification.  
Clinical samples included patients with DSM-IV diagnosed obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD group), any DSM-IV diagnosed anxiety disorder except OCD or simple 
phobia (Anxious group), and depressive disorder (Depressed group). All diagnoses 
represented the most severe problem of patients. Patients with secondary comorbid Axis-I 
diagnoses were included. Patients with a current or past psychotic disorder, dementia, 
mental retardation, a current substance use disorder or Axis-II diagnosis were excluded. In 
addition, anxious patients were excluded if they had a current or past OCD.   
These clinical participants were outpatients recruited from two outpatient mental 
health clinics and five different private practice settings in Northern and Central Italy. 
During the routine assessment phase, patients were interviewed by a member of our 
research team (all Ph.D. level psychologists experienced in diagnosing psychiatric 
disorders) using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
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Williams, 1996), to establish DSM-IV diagnoses. Although inter-rater reliability for the main 
diagnosis was not examined formally, each case was audio-recorded and carefully 
reviewed in supervisory meetings; all diagnoses were reached by rater consensus. After 
screening, suitable patients were invited to complete measures administered individually. 
All clinical and non-clinical individuals participated on a voluntary basis and gave 
their written consent before taking part to the study. This study was approved by the 
human subjects review committee of the University of Padova. The sequence of self-report 
measures was rotated to control for order effects. 
Overall, sixty patients were recruited for our study: four (2.4%) were excluded 
because had one or more Axis-II diagnosis and three (1,8%) refused to participate after 
screening process. The final sample consisted of 30 OCD patients, 12 anxious patients 
and 11 depressed patients (all were Caucasian). The frequency of each principal anxiety 
disorder diagnosis in the anxious group was 8 (67%) generalized anxiety disorder, 3 (25%) 
panic disorder without agoraphobia, and 1 (8%) panic disorder with agoraphobia. In the 
depressed group the frequency of each principal depressive disorder diagnosis was: 7 
(63.6%) major depressive disorder, and 4 (36.4%) dysthymic disorder. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics on various demographic variables for the three clinical groups. 
Groups were equivalent with respect to all demographic variables (all ps>.05), with the 
exception of age and education: depressed patients were older and had fewer years of 
education than OCD and anxious patients. As expected, the OCD sample scored 
significantly higher than anxious and depressed groups on the Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002; Sica et al., 2009), a standard measure of the 
OCD severity. The clinical groups did not differ significantly on the Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(Beck et al., 1988; Sica et al., 2006; Sica & Ghisi, 2007) or the Beck Depression Inventory-
Second Edition (Beck et al., 1996; Ghisi et al., 2006; Sica & Ghisi, 2007). 
10 
 
 
Measures 
The Not Just Right Experiences-Questionnaire-Revised (Coles et al., 2005) is 
composed of 19 items. The first 10 items present sample NJREs (e.g., ‘‘I have had the 
sensation after getting dressed that parts of my clothes …did not feel just right.’’ ‘‘I have 
had the sensation while organizing my desk that my papers and other things didn’t look 
just right.’’) and instruct respondents to indicate whether they experienced these within the 
past month. The next two items ask respondents to indicate which NJRE occurred most 
recently and when it last occurred (past few hours to past month). Lastly, respondents rate 
the frequency, intensity, immediate distress, delayed distress, rumination, urge to respond, 
and sense of responsibility associated with the most recent NJRE on a scale from 1 
(absence) to 7 (extreme). The sum of ratings for these last seven items comprises the 
NJRE-Q-R Severity scale. Coles et al. (2003) found good internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.79) for the 10 sample NJRE items, and all 19 items showed good convergent and 
discriminant validity evident in stronger correlations with OCD symptoms than with 
depressive symptoms, trait anxiety, social anxiety, or worry.    
Standard steps outlined in the psychology literature guided the translation process 
for the NJRE-Q-R (e.g., Brislin, 1986). In the first step, three independent researchers 
translated the questionnaire from English to Italian and then reached agreement on a 
common version. Idiomatic Italian at the sixth-grade level was used for this step. In 
addition, the researchers reviewed the common version to ensure there were no 
colloquialisms, slang, or esoteric phrases that would make interpretation difficult. The 
shared form was then back-translated by a bilingual person with an extensive knowledge 
of psychological research. The back-translation proved to be nearly identical to the original 
one. As a final step, the NJRE-Q-R items of the Italian version were rated by 5 experts in 
anxiety disorders. Each expert rated the items on a 5-point scale (1=not at all, 5= 
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extremely) for clarity (the extent to which the item is clearly described). As experts’ ratings 
indicated excellent clarity (mean across all items=4.5; DS=0.7), no further item refinement 
was necessary. 
 
Other Measures of Psychopathology 
All participants completed a background information questionnaire and the following 
measures: 
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) is a widely 
used 18-item self-report questionnaire assessing the severity of OC symptoms on 5-point 
Likert scale. The items are grouped into six subscales (washing, checking, ordering, 
obsessing, hoarding, and mental neutralizing) and a total score is also derived. Initial 
reports supported the reliability and validity of this instrument, and showed strong 
convergence with established measures of OCD, moderate to high internal consistency 
across the six subscales, and adequate to high test-retest stability (Foa et al., 2002). The 
Italian version of OCI-R (Sica et al., 2009) was administered to 340 community controls, 
52 OCD patients, and 36 anxious patients. The findings indicated good internal 
consistency and a 30-day retest reliability ranged from .76 to .99, as well as good 
convergent, divergent, and criterion validity (Sica et al., 2009). In the present study, the 
alpha coefficient for the total OCI-R was .84 in the student sample and .90 in the clinical 
sample. Moreover, in accord to the Italian validation study (Sica et al., 2009), alpha 
coefficients for the OCI-R subscales exceed .70  except mental neutralizing (alpha=.50) in 
student sample, whereas all coefficients were above .85 in clinical sample. 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item 
self-report with excellent psychometric properties that measures the severity of anxiety. 
The Italian version of the BAI was administered to 654 undergraduates, 831 community 
controls and 64 anxious patients. The findings indicated good internal consistency 
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(Cronbach’s alpha = .89) and a 30-day retest reliability of .62, as well as good convergent, 
divergent, and criterion validity (Sica, Coradeschi, Ghisi, & Sanavio, 2006; Sica & Ghisi, 
2007). In the present study, the alpha coefficient for the BAI was .84 in the student sample 
and .90 in the clinical sample.  
The Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). 
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report scale that assesses the severity of affective, cognitive, 
motivational, vegetative, and psychomotor components of depression. The BDI-II has 
excellent reliability and validity and is widely used in clinical research. The Italian version of 
the BDI-II was administered to 733 undergraduates, 354 community controls and 135 
depressed patients. The findings indicated a good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.80) and a 30-day retest reliability of .76, as well as good convergent, divergent, and 
criterion validity (Ghisi, Flebus, Montano, Sanavio, & Sica 2006; Sica & Ghisi, 2007). In the 
present study, the alpha coefficient for the BDI-II was .85 in the student sample and .87 in 
the clinical sample. 
The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & Flett, 1991, 2004) is a 45-item 
self-report measure of perfectionistic tendencies. Consisting of three subscales of 15-items 
each, the questionnaire measures self-oriented perfectionism (e.g., I must always be 
successful at school or work), other-oriented perfectionism (e.g., It is not important that the 
people close to me are successful), and socially prescribed perfectionism (e.g., The 
people around me expect me to succeed at everything I do). Extensive evidence attests to 
the reliability and validity of the MPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991, 2004). The Italian version of the 
MPS was administered to 348 undergraduates (43.7% females). The findings indicated 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .75 to .88; Sica, 2004). In the 
present study the alpha coefficients for MPS subscales ranged from .74 to .91 in the 
student sample and from .69 to .88 in the clinical sample. 
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Lastly, the clinical sample completed also the Italian version of the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997; 
2003; 2005). The original OBQ is a self-report instrument consisting of 87 items 
representing dysfunctional beliefs assessed in 6 domains identified by OCCWG as central 
to OCD. Each item is rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree very much) to 7 
(agree very much). The Italian version of the OBQ (Dorz et al., 2009) was derived from a 
confirmative factorial analysis on a sample of 752 university students (63.4% females) and 
comprised 46 items divided in five domains/subscales: excessive responsibility for 
omission, excessive responsibility for commission, over-importance of thoughts, excessive 
control of thoughts and perfectionism. The Italian version of the OBQ has shown good  
internal consistency for the five scales (Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .68 to .86) as well 
as good validity. In the present study the alpha coefficient for the OBQ total was .95 in the 
clinical sample.  
 Distributions of the variables were examined for normality prior to statistical 
analyses, and there was not evidence of significant skewness among our samples.  
 
RESULTS 
 
NJREs in Students and OCD Patients 
Eighty-three percent of undergraduates reported having experienced at least one of 
the 10 NJREs described in the NJRE-Q-R. The percentage of undergraduates 
experiencing at least one of the 10 NJREs was 13% within the past few hours, 21% within 
the past day, 36% within the past week, and 13% within the past month. The most 
common were: “When talking to people, I have had the sensation that my words did not 
sound just right” (60.7% of participants), “I have had the sensation while writing something 
down that the words did not look just how I wanted them to look” (38%) and “I have had 
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the sensation while folding my clothes that they did not look the way folded clothes should 
look” (33%).  
All OCD participants reported having experienced at least one of the 10 NJREs 
described in the NJRE-Q-R. The percentage of OCD participants experiencing at least one 
of the 10 NJREs was 50% within the past few hours, 24% within the past day, 24% within 
the past week, and 2% within the past month. The most common NJREs were: “After 
washing my hands once, I have had the sensation that they did not feel just the way clean 
hands are supposed to feel” (73%); “When talking to people, I have had the sensation that 
my words did not sound just right” (57%), and “I have had the sensation while organizing 
my desk that my papers and other things didn’t look just right” (50%).   
Psychometric Properties of the NJRE-Q-R Severity Scale 
In order to explore the latent structure of the Italian version of the NJRE-Q-R, a 
principal-axis extraction method was performed on the student sample. The unrotated 
matrix yielded one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0., explaining 65% of  total 
variance. All the NJRE-Q-R  items loaded significantly on the single factor (loading 
values>.65), providing support for a unidimensional measure of NJRE. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the NJRE-Q-R Severity scale was high in both the 
undergraduate (.87) and OCD sample (.89), further confirming that items converged on a 
common construct. Pearson’s r was computed on a subsample of 50 undergraduates to 
assess test-retest reliability at a 1-month interval. Temporal stability was good (.76), 
especially in view of the relatively long time frame for retest. Means and standard 
deviations for total and single item scores for both groups are shown in Table 2. All scores 
were significantly higher for clinical individuals.  
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Relationship of NJREs to OCD Features and Other Psychopatology  
As shown in Table 3 all correlations between the NJRE-Q-R Severity scale and 
other symptom measures were generally small. NJRE-Q-R Severity was significantly 
correlated with all the OCI-R scales except Mental Neutralizing. The correlation with OCI-R 
total score was significantly higher than correlations with the other symptom measures (all 
z values >1.96, p<.05). 
To examine the unique contribute of NJREs in predicting OCD symptoms, a 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed. In the first step of the analysis, 
BAI, BDI-II and MPS scores were entered. In the second step we entered the NJRE-Q-R 
Severity score. The independent variable was the OCI-R total score. Result for the final 
equations is shown in Table 4 (tolerance values for these equations were above .90, 
indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem; Norusis, 1988). The NJRE-Q-R scale 
accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in OCI-R, even after controlling for 
general distress and perfectionism.  
Lastly, correlations between the NJRE-Q-R Severity and OCI-R subscales  
remained significant after controlling for anxiety (BAI), depression (BDI-II) and 
perfectionism (MPS): partial rs were .25 for washing, .23 for checking, .21 for ordering, .21 
for obsessing and .20 for hoarding. These two last results demonstrated a specific 
association between NJREs and OCD symptoms.  
 
Discriminant Power of the NJRE-Q-R Severity scale 
Before comparing the three clinical groups on the NJRE-Q-R Severity scale, 
Cronbach’s alpha was computed for anxious and depressed patients. Reliability was high 
for both groups (Anxious= .87; Depressed= .86).   
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Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed using the NJRE-Q-R 
Severity total and the single item scores as the dependent variables, patient group as the 
independent variable and the BAI, BDI-II and MPS scores as covariates. This assessed 
sample effects on NJRE-Q-R severity, controlling for general distress and perfectionism. 
Although the three groups differed in age and educational level, the NJRE-Q-R severity 
score did not correlate significantly with age (Pearson’s r=-.15) or educational level 
(Pearson’s r=.15) in this sample. Accordingly, age and educational level were not used as 
covariates in the model. 
The MANOVA resulted significant (Pillai’s F(14,79)=3.6, p<.001). Therefore, a series 
of covariance analyses (with BAI, BDI-II and MPS scores as covariates) was performed on 
NJRE-Q-R Severity total and the single item scores, using Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) 
test for post-hoc comparisons. 
Results showed that the OCD sample scored significantly higher than anxious and 
depressed patients on all scores (Table 5). Moreover, the NJRE-Q-R Severity total and 
single items scores did not distinguish anxious from depressed patients. To evaluate the 
magnitude of the significant results, eta squared values (η2) were also computed by 
comparing the three groups in pairs. According to Cohen (1988), η2=0.1 corresponds to a 
small effect size, η2=0.6 to a medium effect and η2=1.4 to a large effect size. Results 
suggested that the magnitude of the differences was generally low to medium both when 
OCDs were compared to anxious patients and when OCDs were compared to depressed 
individuals.  
 
Specificity of the NJRE-Q-R Severity scale 
 Two covariance analyses were performed to investigate the hypothesized 
differential role (specificity) of OC beliefs and NJREs in OCD. In the first analysis, the 
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NJRE-Q-R Severity score was the dependent variable, patient sample was the 
independent variable, and BAI, BDI-II, and OBQ total scores were covariates. This 
analysis examined whether NJRE-Q-R Severity discriminated among the three groups 
after controlling for general distress and OC beliefs. In the second analysis, the OBQ total 
score served as the dependent variable, patient sample was the independent variable, and 
BAI, BDI-II, and NJRE-Q-R Severity were covariates. This analysis explored whether the 
OBQ discriminated among the three groups once the effect of general distress and NJREs 
was controlled. Results favoured our hypothesis: whereas NJRE-Q-R Severity 
discriminated among clinical groups (F(2,45)=15, p<.001), the OBQ did not (F(2,45)=0.4, 
p=.66). Furthermore, in the first analysis no symptom measures used as covariates were 
significant, further indicating the specificity of the NJREs measure.  
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our study demonstrated that NJREs could be reliably measured through a self-
report format in both non-clinical and clinical Italian individuals: the NJRE-Q-R Severity 
scale demonstrated unidimensionality, excellent internal homogeneity and good temporal 
stability.     
Low correlations, albeit significant, between NJREs and OCD features were found 
in student sample. It is important to stress that small correlation values were expected 
since the NJRE-Q-R Severity is not a symptom scale but rather a measure of a complex 
construct. In fact, similar values were found in a previous Italian study, wherein a modified 
version of NJRE-Q-R Severity scale administered to 104 undergraduates showed 
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correlations with the Padua Inventory subscales ranging from .02 to .24 (Mancini, 
Gangemi, Perdighe & Marini, 2008). The negligible correlation between NJREs and mental 
neutralizing can be further explained by the poor reliability of this last measure in our and 
other non-clinical samples.  Sica et al. (2009) argued that because neutralizing is rare in 
non-OCD individuals, the diminished alpha coefficients for this subscale in non clinical 
samples may reflect a restricted range rather than structural inadequacy. On the other 
hand, it is important to note that the content of the items of this scale – all dealing with 
numbers and counting complaints – may fail to capture many clinically relevant 
neutralization phenomena (Gonner, Leonhart & Ecker, 2008).   
In any case, our results provide support for a specific relationship between NJREs 
and OCD. First, the correlation with OCI-R total score was significantly higher than 
correlations with the other symptom measures; second, after controlling for anxiety, 
depression and perfectionism the NJRE-Q-R Severity remained significantly associated 
with OCD symptoms. This finding also suggests that NJREs are not just another form of 
perfectionism.  
Inspection of correlations revealed that NJRE-Q-R Severity was equally related to 
the various types of OCD symptoms. Perhaps, this measure detects a general vulnerability 
for OCD and is therefore less sensitive to OCD heterogeneity. Alternatively, a ceiling effect 
due to the nature of the sample may be present: a non-clinical sample may have 
prevented detection of differences in OCD symptoms and consequently differential 
associations with NJREs.  
The NJRE-Q-R Severity scale clearly discriminated OCD patients from patients with 
other anxiety disorders or depression. A central result was that the NJREs measure was 
able to differentiate the clinical groups over and above OC beliefs, whereas the opposite 
was not true. Even though this result warrants more research, this is one of the first 
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studies which demonstrates that NJREs may have a more specific role than OC beliefs in 
OCD symptoms.  
Overall, our results indicate a potential specific role of NJREs in OCD and are 
consistent with previous empirical work (Coles et al., 2003, 2005). Of course, the 
correlational nature of the present study cannot establish whether NJREs may be causal 
for OCD or a simple epiphenomena . However, should the role of NJREs in OCD be 
established, how can this construct improve our knowledge of OCD? First, NJREs could 
be formally incorporated into OCD psychological models, given its seemingly specific 
relationship to OC features. Indeed, many clinical descriptions of OCD indicate NJRE-like 
concepts as an important component of this disorder. For instance, Summerfeldt et al. 
(1999) remarked that many compulsions seem aimed at reducing distress rather than at 
avoiding feared consequences; Feinstein, Faloon, Petkova and  Liebowitz (2003) found 
evidence distinguishing washing compulsions that reduce “uncomfortable feelings” of 
contamination from those that reduce fears of harm. A recent study of Pietrafesa and 
Coles (2009) found that self-reported levels of incompleteness (i.e., NJREs) and harm 
avoidance uniquely predicted participants’ ratings of their experiences while performing  
OCD-relevant behavioral tasks. Therefore, further precision in distinguishing the 
motivations behind symptoms (e.g., fear reduction Vs. NJREs) may help clarify the 
heterogeneous nature of OCD.  
In addition, further research can explore whether compulsions aimed at harm 
avoidance versus producing a just-right sensation are mediated by the same 
neuroanatomical substrates. If variations are found, they may have important implications 
for pharmacotherapy and other biological approaches to treatment.  
NJREs may play an important role in predicting treatment outcome. Foa and Kozak 
(1986) proposed that reductions in OCD symptoms are moderated by reductions in 
estimates of the probability of feared consequences achieved via repeated 
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disconfirmations of the expected outcome. Therefore, when a feared consequence is not 
clearly articulated, the efficacy of corrective exposures may be compromised (Foa, 
Abramowitz, Franklin, and Kozak, 1999; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). It is possible that 
patients who did not articulate feared consequences may have been distressed by NJREs. 
NJREs might also be considered (and investigated) as a putative marker for OCD, 
in the same way in which the construct Anxiety Sensitivity (AS) is deemed a psychological 
marker of anxiety disorders in general and panic disorder in particular (e.g., Brown, Smits, 
Powers, & Telch, 2003; Rapee & Medoro, 1994; Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997; Smits, 
Powers, Cho, & Telch, 2004; see literature on endophenotypes, Chamberlain et al., 2008).  
The current study has a number of limitations. The student sample was relatively 
restricted in educational level, ethnic backgrounds, and socio-economic status and thus 
our results need to be replicated on normative samples with broader demographic 
characteristics. Results on clinical individuals are limited by the relatively small size of the 
samples and by using Axis II comorbidity as a sample exclusion criterion. Actually, in order 
to have more interpretable data (keeping also in mind the scarcity of empirical research 
about NJREs) we elected to reduce a complex source of variability such as the presence 
of personality disorders. On the other hand, the exclusion of AXIS II patients might limit 
generalizability of findings to 'real world' samples, even though only a few patients were 
excluded because of this criterion. Also, our small OCD sample did not make possible to 
investigate NJREs in various OCD subgroups (e.g., washer, checker, etc.). Future studies 
are needed to examine this issue, considering the possible importance of this 
differentiation (e.g., Ecker & Gonner, 2008). 
As far as the internal structure of NJRE-Q-R is concerned, we acknowledge that 
relying solely on Eigenvalues to determine the number of factors is not particularly 
sophisticated, mainly because using the > 1 rule is overinclusive in terms of the number of 
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factors. Clearly this was not the case here with only 1 factor meeting this criterion, which 
explained a substantial proportion of the variance. 
Lastly, although we examined NJREs in relation to other domains of 
psychopathology (anxiety and depression), our results require confirmation from studies 
evaluating NJREs in other clinical conditions such as hypochondriasis or eating disorders. 
We have sought to reduce the impact of these limitations by careful participant selection in 
the recruitment process, as well our choice of well validated instruments. In fact, the 
results appear in line with our hypotheses and consistent with theoretical bases.  
In conclusion, the present study continues the tradition of exploring complex 
constructs and processes in psychopathology (e.g., Riskind & Williams, 2005).  No doubt 
that investigation of such processes will advance our knowledge of vulnerability for 
psychopathology.    
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Table 1. Demographic data and levels of symptomatology across clinical samples. 
 OCD 
(30) 
 AG 
(12) 
DG 
(11) 
Chi 2 or F 
associate
d 
probability 
Significant 
SNK 
post-hoc 
comparison 
(p<.05) 
Age 33.6 (12.6) 36.8 (8.4) 50.9 (6.2) 8.5 DG >OCD, AG  
Years of 
education 
13.9 (3.3) 11.8 (2) 10.4 (3.3) 5.9 DG <OCD  
% of males 40 58.3 36.4 NS - 
% of married/ 
cohabitant 
43.3 50 63.6        NS - 
% of employed 44.8 45.5 27.3 NS - 
% of 
unemployed 
3.4 9.1 0 NS - 
OCI-R 32.4 (12.7) 17.1 (15.4) 15.8 (14.5) 8.6 OCD>AG, DG 
BAI  18.5 (12) 25.3 (14.8) 19.3 (6.1) NS - 
BDI-II 20 (10.1) 19.4 (11.2) 23.7 (4.5) NS - 
Notes: NS= non significant; standard deviations in brackets; SNK= Student Newman 
Keuls; OCD= Obsessive-compulsive disorder group; AG= Anxious group; DG= Depressed 
group; OCI-R= Obsessive Compulsive Inventory- Revised; BAI= Beck Anxiety Inventory; 
BDI-II Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition. 
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Table 2. Mean (standard deviation) for items and total score of the NJRE-Q-R Severity 
scale for undergraduate and OCD samples 
 Undergraduates 
(N=412) 
OCD (N=30) 
Frequency 3.7 (1.8) 6.2 (0.9) 
Intensity 3.0 (1.4) 5.4 (1.3) 
Immediate 
Distress 
2.9 (1.6) 5.3 (1.3) 
Delayed Distress 2.1 (1.4) 4.0 (1.8) 
Rumination 1.9 (1.2) 4.6 (1.7) 
Urge to respond 2.7 (1.7) 5.3 (1.8) 
Responsibility 2.6 (1.6) 4.8 (1.8) 
Total Score 19.0 (8.6) 35.6 (8.3)  
Note: Groups differed in all scores at p-level <.001   
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Table 3. Correlations of NJRE-Q-R Severity scale and symptoms for 412 undergraduates   
 
NJRE-Q-R Severity 
OCI-R Washing .32  
OCI-R Checking .28 
OCI-R Ordering .30 
OCI-R Obsessing .31 
OCI-R Mental Neutralizing -.03 
OCI-R Hoarding .31 
OCI-Total Score .42 
BAI .33 
BDI-II .26 
MPS-Self .20 
MPS-Other .22 
MPS-Social .30 
All correlations significant at p<.001 except OCI-R Mental Neutralizing.OCI-R =Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory-Revised; BAI= Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory – II; MPS= Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale  
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Table 4. Summary of final regression statistics for general distress, perfectionism and the 
NJRE-Q-R Severity scale on OCD symptoms as measured by the OCI-R Total score 
Predictors Step 1 Step 2 
 Beta r sr p 
values  
R2 Beta r sr p 
values  
R2 
BAI .32 .28 .26 .0001  .26 .23 .20 .0001  
BDI-II .05 .07 .05 .38  .05 .05 .04 .43  
MPS-Self .07 .07 .06 .30  .08 .08 .07 .23  
MPS-
Other 
-.10 -.10 -.09 .13  
 
-.12 -.12 -.10 .06  
MPS-
Social 
.19 .17 .15 .007 .22 .14 .14 .10 .05  
NJRE-Q-
R 
Severity 
scale 
- - - - - .30 .31 .27 .0001 .30 
 
Notes: r = partial correlation; sr = semi-partial correlation; Increment in R2 from the first to 
second step=.08; N= 412 undergraduates; BAI= Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory – II; MPS= Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale;  
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Table 5. Group comparisons on the NJRE-Q-R Severity total and single items  
 
 
OCD 
(30) 
AG 
(12) 
DG 
(11) 
Analysis of 
covariance 
outcome 
Significant 
SNK 
post-hoc 
comparison 
(p<.05) 
η2 
values 
(OCD 
vs. AG) 
η2 
values 
(OCD 
vs. DG) 
Frequency 6.1 
(0.2) 
4.2 
(0.4) 
 
3.5 
(0.5) 
 
F(2,46)=15.8 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.33 
 
0.57 
Intensity 5.4 
(0.2) 
3 (0.4) 
 
3.2 
(0.4) 
 
F(2,46)=21.3 
 
OCD>AG,DG 0.46 
 
0.39 
 
Immediate 
Distress 
5.2 
(0.3) 
3.3 
(0.4) 
 
3.4 
(0.5) 
 
F(2,46)=9.2 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.30 
 
0.23 
 
Delayed 
Distress 
3.9 
(0.3) 
2.8 
(0.5) 
 
1.7 
(0.6) 
 
F(2,46)=5.8 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.10 
 
0.24 
 
Rumination 4.5 
(0.3) 
2.3 
(0.5) 
 
1.5 
(0.6) 
     
F(2,46)=15.9 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.27 
 
0.40 
 
Urge to respond 5.2 
(0.3) 
3.2 
(0.6) 
 
2.5 
(0.6) 
 
F(2,46)=10 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.19 
 
0.30 
 
Responsibility 4.8 
(0.3) 
2.6 
(0.5) 
 
2.7 
(0.6) 
 
F(2,46)=8.6 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.25 
 
0.15 
 
Total Score 35.2 
(1.5)  
21.4 
(2.5) 
18.5 
(2.9) 
F(2,46)=19.6 
 
OCD>AG,DG 
 
0.40 0.44 
Notes: standard error in brackets; all F values associated with p<.01; SNK= Student 
Newman Keuls; OCD= Obsessive-compulsive disorder group; AG= Anxious group; DG= 
Depressed group 
 
